Outright Assassination Page 5
The Greater Syria scheme is a threat to the independence of the two states in the region it seeks to unite [namely Syria and Lebanon]. It relinquishes the territories of Cilicia and Alexendretta, consecrates sectarianism in Lebanon and seeks to turn the country into a religious safe haven for a particular group. Conversely, it endeavours to establish a Jewish home in the heart of a dear sector, which has struggled hard to defend itself from the alien Jews. In addition to all of this, the scheme calls for a system of government that it is inimical with the foundations of modern civilization and its concepts, as well as with all the values that every open-minded person cherishes.58
For a political party that had so signally struggled for Syrian unification, the declaration was a clear ideological reversal: it showed how far it had been Lebanonized within a period of a mere two or three years. Sa’adeh’s initial reaction to this development was surprisingly mild and cautious – the proverbial calm before the storm. He tried in vain to dissuade the perpetrators from going further down that path and constantly affirmed his position that no circumstances should deflect the party from its national objectives. His appeals fell on deaf ears. Though still officially the party’s undisputed leader, Sa’adeh refrained from taking disciplinary action against the deviationists so as not to give the government an excuse to extend his banishment. The strategy did not proceed entirely smoothly, but it spared the party the pain of an internal split.
Notes
1 It is customary to associate Sa’adeh with right-wing politics on account of his commitment to nationalism and extreme dislike of traditional electoral politics. That much is true. But Sa’adeh was also a strong advocate of Leftist reforms, the kind that promotes intervention in favor of egalitarianism, and gives little or no authority to tradition. Most Lebanese regard him as neither left nor right but definitively anti-Establishment.
2 In modern usage, the Star Chamber is used, metaphorically or poetically, in reference to legal or administrative bodies that exercise strict, arbitrary rulings and secretive proceedings. It is a pejorative term and intended to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the proceedings. On Star Chamber see William Hargrave, A Treatise on the Court of Star Chamber. Legal Classics Library, 1986; and Samuel Rawson, Reports of Cases in the Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission. London: Camden Society, 1886.
3 Sofia Antun Sa’adeh, The Social Structure of Lebanon: Democracy or Servitude? Beirut: Dar An-Nahar, 1993: 10.
4 Manochehr Dorraj, “The Political Sociology of Sect and Sectarianism in Iranian Politics: 1960–1979.” Journal of Third World Studies. Volume 23, No. 2 (Fall 2006): 95–117.
5 Simon Haddad, “Christian-Muslim Relations and Attitudes towards the Lebanese State.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 2001): 131.
6 See Sami A. Ofeish, “Lebanon’s Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian Application.” Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 21 (Winter, 1999): 97–117.
7 Ibid.
8 Even though Articles 7 and 12 provide for equality of civil and political rights and equal access to public posts based on merit, Article 95 affirms the state’s commitment to confessionalism, but without setting forth how it is to be applied.
9 Ladan Madeleine Moghaddas, Civil Society and Political Democracy in Lebanon, MA Thesis, Jönköping (January 2006): 42.
10 See S. Khalaf, “Changing forms of political patronage in Lebanon” in Gellner, E. and Waterbury, J. (eds.), Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies. London: Gerard Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1977: 185–205.
11 David Grafton, The Christians of Lebanon: Political Rights in Islamic Law, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004: 104.
12 Philip Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920–1945. Princeton University Press, 1987: 58.
13 Some Lebanese dispute the existence of the National Pact and have labelled it as “a created legend.” See Hala Kilani, “National Pact: myth or reality?” Daily Star, Beirut, 21 November, 2002.
14 New York Herald Tribune, New York: 16 November, 1943.
15 Ibid.
16 Eugenie Elie Abouchdid, Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria (1917–1947). Beirut: The Sader-Rihani Printing Co., 1948: 81.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 83.
19 Eyal Zisser, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence. London: I. B. Tauris, 2000:
103.
20 Meir Zamir, “From Hegemony to Marginalism: The Maronites of Lebanon” in Bengio, Ofra and Ben-Dor, Gabriel (eds.), Minorities and the State in the Arab World. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1999.
21 G. Akl, A. Ouadat, E. Hunein (eds.), The Black Book of the Lebanese Elections of May 25, 1947. New York: Phoenicia Press, 1947: 3–4.
22 On Sa’adeh’s distinctiveness see Mustapha Abdul Satir, Shu’un Qawmiyyah (National Issues). Beirut: Dar Fikr, 1990: 29–45.
23 Nadim Makdisi, The Syrian National Party: A Case Study of the First Inroads of National Socialism in the Arab World, unpub. PhD. Dissertation, American University of Beirut, 1959: 15.
24 Hisham Sharabi, Images from the Past: An Autobiography. Beirut: Dar Nelson, 1989: 121.
25 See Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920–1945. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987.
26 An interesting depiction of that era can be found in Edward Selim Atiyah, An Arab Tells his Story: A Study in Loyalties. London: J. Murray, 1946.
27 Sa’adeh recalled this phase in his life as follows: “When I began to give serious thought to the resuscitation of our nation against the background of the irresponsible political movements rampant in its midst, it became forthwith certain to me that our most urgent problem was the determination of our national identity and our social reality. Although there was no consensus of opinion concerning this problem, I became convinced that the starting point of every correct national endeavor must be the raising of this fundamental philosophical question: Who are we? After extensive research, I arrived at the following conclusion: We are Syrians and we constitute a distinct national entity.” A. Sa’adeh, al-Muhadarat al-Ashr (The Ten Lectures). Beirut: SSNP Publications, 1978.
28 Ibid.
29 Sa’adeh, al-Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works). Vol. 1. Beirut: SSNP Cultural Bureau, n.d.: 124.
30 Adel Beshara, Syrian Nationalism: An Inquiry into the Political Philosophy of Antun Sa’adeh. Beirut: Dar Bissan, 1995.
31 Sa’adeh renamed the party to the Syrian Social National Party to underpin its philosophical outlook as ‘social’ or ‘societal’ oriented. It is not to be confused with ‘socialism’ or ‘national socialism’ which, in Arabic, translate into ishtiraqqiyah as opposed to ijtima’iyah. See Aboud Aboud, The S.N.S.P. Sydney: An-Nahda, 1982: 31.
32 Nicos Ponlantzas, State, Power, Socialism. London: New Left Books, 1978: 115.
33 Antun Sa’adeh, “al-wihda al-Suriyya” (Syrian Unity), al-Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works). Vol. 1. Beirut: SSNP Cultural Bureau, n.d.: 4–16.
34 Antun Sa’adeh, al-Muhadarat al-Ashr (The Ten Lectures): 183.
35 Antun Sa’adeh, Marahil al-Mas’alla al-Lubnaniyah (The Stages of the Lebanese Question), 2nd ed. Beirut: Fikr Publications, 1991: 40.
36 Quoted in Inam Raad, Antun Sa’adeh wa al-In’izaliyun (Antun Sa’adeh and the Isolationists). Beirut: Fikr Publications, 1980: 54. The Phoenician thesis postulated the existence of a distinctive Lebanese national essence persisting from the Phoenician era to the present.
37 A. Sa’adeh, “The Maronites are Syriac Syrians,” al-Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works). Vol. 16. Beirut: SSNP Cultural Bureau, n.d.: 164.
38 See volume 3 of his Complete Works.
39 On Lebanese zuama politics see Arnold Hottinger, “Zu’ama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958.” Middle East Journal (1961): 85–103.
40 A. Sa’adeh, al-Muhadarat al-Ashr (The Ten Lectures): 38.
41 A. Sa’adeh, Mukhtarat fi al-Mas’allah al-Lubnaniyyah (Selected Works on the Lebanese Question). Beirut: Dar Fikr,
1978: 44.
42 Inam Raad, Antun Sa’adeh wa al-In’izaliyun (Antun Sa’adeh and the Isolationists). Beirut: Dar Fikr, 1980.
43 Raghid Solh, “The attitude of the Arab nationalists towards Greater Lebanon during the 1930s,” in Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills (eds.), Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus. London: I. B. Tauris and Co Ltd, 1988: 152.
44 Ibid., 152.
45 Antun Sa’adeh, al-Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works). Vol. 2. Beirut: SSNP Cultural Bureau, n.d.: 214.
46 A Lebanese nationalist party which endeavoured to establish a degree of organization and cohesion which older groups of Lebanese nationalism had not for the most part possessed. The party described itself as “a patriotic youth organization” and defined its aim as “the establishment of a Lebanese nation, conscious of its duties and rights in an independent and sovereign state.” In practice, however, the majority of its adherents, like its leader, Pierre Jumayyel, were Maronites educated by the Jesuits. See The Phalanges Libanaise, Statutes, 1 July, 1938, Article 1. See also I. Rababi, “The Phalanges Libanaise: Its Aim and Organization,” a speech delivered on 5 February, 1939.
47 A predominantly Moslem organization with Pan-Arab doctrines. Although in principle open to members of all religious communities and purporting to be a “national” organization operating above daily party politics (Articles 6 and 7 of the Najjadah Basic Principles (1937) forbid members of the organization from participating in national elections even in their personal capacities before resigning from it), in practice the Najjadah became the anti-thesis of the ‘Phalanges Libanaise’ among the Lebanese Muslims. Politically, the Najjadah did not oppose the existence of Lebanon as a separate national entity but, convinced that “Lebanon has the same duties and rights as all the other Arab countries,” it tried to link it in the general movement for Arab union.
48 The Syrian Bulletin, no. 215.
49 Oriente Moderno, Vol. XVII, 1937: 231.
50 Labib Z. Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis. Harvard: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1969: 58.
51 Sa’adeh travelled overland to Jordan during which he met King Abdullah. The meeting was brief and fruitless apparently due to a personality conflict between the two men. Sa’adeh then crossed to Palestine and from there to Cyprus in the first leg of a long journey that would take him to Europe and South America. See John Daye, Sa’adeh wa Hisham Sharabi (Sa’adeh and Hisham Sharabi). Beirut: Dar Nelson, 2004: 31–32.
52 Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay. Beirut: Librairie Du Liban, 1968: 230.
53 Gibran Jreige, Haqa’iq Ain al-Istiqlal: Ayyam Rashayya, 4th edition. Beirut: Dar Amwaj, 2000: 22. It is claimed that the party played a decisive role in getting el-Khoury elected to parliament for the Maronite seat in Mount Lebanon in view of its popularity in that constituency.
54 In fact, the only fatality in Lebanon’s independence campaign was one Said Fakhr ad-Din, a partisan of Sa’adeh. In 1946, the Lebanese President, Beshara el-Khoury, issued a decree (K/9377) in which he recognized the SNP member Said Fakhr ad-Din as a martyr and awarded him the Medal of National Struggle (Midaliyat al-Jihad al-Watani). Ibid.: 33
55 See N. E. Bou Nakhlie, “Les Troupes Speciales: Religious and Ethnic Recruitment, 1916–1946.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Nov. 1993): 645–660.
56 An unwritten agreement between el-Khoury and el-Solh, the National Pact aimed principally at consolidating Lebanon as an independent state within a power-sharing arrangement between the various sectarian groups. The main principles of the Pact were: (1) Lebanon was to be a completely independent state; (2) the Christian communities were to cease identifying with the West and, in return, the Muslim communities were to protect the independence of Lebanon and prevent its merger with any Arab state; (3) that Lebanon, though an Arab country, can still maintain its spiritual and intellectual ties with the West; (4) Lebanon, as a member of the family of Arab states, should cooperate with the other Arab states and remain neutral in conflicts among them; and (5) public offices should be distributed proportionally among the recognized religious groups. See Farid El-Khazen, The Communal Pact of National Identities: The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact. Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1991.
57 Labib Z. Yamak, The Syrian Social Nationalist Party: An Ideological Analysis. Harvard: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1969: 61.
58 Fayez Sayegh, The Greater Syria Scheme. Beirut: The Syrian National Party Information Bureau, 6 December, 1946: 26.
2 CONFRONTATION
The Confrontation Reignites
In March 1947, after extensive lobbying at home and abroad, Sa’adeh was finally re-admitted into Lebanon. It is claimed that in giving assent to Sa’adeh’s return, President Khoury expected to draw political capital from the SNP in the general elections which were scheduled in May of the same year.1 However, upon his arrival, Sa’adeh foiled this plan by declaring all previous agreements between the SNP and the Lebanese government null and void. In a clean break with the political atmosphere of the day, he again questioned the meaning of Lebanon as an entity and its recently-acquired independence:
The Lebanese entity! What is the real meaning of the Lebanese entity? Is it an iron mould in which thought in Lebanon can be placed to implode into itself? Or is it a sphere of safety, a point from which thought can proceed to diffuse brotherhood throughout the whole nation, to spread unity and unify ranks, and to unite the whole nation on a single future from which we refuse to deviate even by one hairbreadth.
What is it that the Lebanese desire from their entity? Is it to have light all for themselves while the surrounding region can remain enshrouded in darkness? If there is light in Lebanon, it is only to be expected that this light should spread itself out throughout the whole of natural Syria. Could we accept that we Lebanon could have a light without all compatriots in our nation having a share in it? That can never be. [Pointing to the masses] This is the Lebanese entity and this is the authentic expression of the sublime feelings and the grand aims embodied in the Lebanese soul. Anything other than this is baseless. It does not represent Lebanon or the will of the Lebanese people at all.
The Lebanese entity depends for its legitimization on the will of the Lebanese people. In all its positions, the party has demonstrated that, on this issue, it places the will of the people above every other consideration. The fact that the party was ready to cooperate with the Lebanese Administrations in everything touching on issue of sovereignty, even in times when it disagreed with their internal policy, clearly shows that the party does not want to impose anything on the Lebanese people.2
Contrary to the assumption sometimes made about him, Sa’adeh did not consider the Lebanese State, even after its independence in 1943, as an enemy. It is clear from the aforesaid that he was concerned about post-independence rather than the destruction of the state. Those who had the opportunity to work closely with him deny that his attitude toward Lebanon was one of simple denunciation.3 Rather, they describe him as a person who detested Lebanese confessional (or consensual) politics, but not Lebanon. He was against the system, not against the country. He saw the interests of Lebanon better served in union rather than separation and foresaw great tribulations for Lebanon under sectarian separatism.4 Despite that, he supported the independence movement in Lebanon in so far as independence served larger national aims. He preferred an independent Lebanon to the mandate but not a separate Lebanon to a unified Syria.
Meantime, Sa’adeh’s diatribes against the state of independence in Lebanon were judged both by the government and Lebanese nationalists as distasteful. He was summoned to appear before the Sûreté Générale to answer “a few questions,” although the real objective was to denigrate him. For the next two months Sa’adeh was to stand at the very centre of one of the longest disputes with the central state. Acting on the advice of his aides, he fled to the mountains above Beirut and skillfully turned his indictment against
the government. From his “hideout” within walking distance of security forces tracking his movement, he issued a public statement clarifying the substance of his speech:
I declared in my speech that I regard the independence that this entity has obtained as a preliminary step that must be built upon to make it an effective force, not an isolated weakling. But the provocateurs turned my views around to make it sound as though I meant that your entity is the preliminary step. There is a world of difference between what I said and what these provocateurs have claimed.5
Consequently, Sa’adeh found himself sucked into a whirlpool of activity and involved in endless meetings and writing editorials, appeals, manifestos, and giving press interviews. The officer-in-charge of the manhunt, Farid Chehab, staked Sa’adeh’s office from “a house on the opposite side”6 but refrained from arresting him “because I was convinced that it was in Lebanon’s best interest not to arrest him at that stage. His arrest, according to my assessment of the situation, would have created problems of which Lebanon stood in no need.”7 The political leadership in Lebanon had other ideas, but it was not very daring. A statement issued by Sa’adeh to the French News Agency in Beirut on 6 March was suppressed, but little else was done to ensnare him. Sensitive to voters’ response, the government must have become increasingly aware that pursuing Sa’adeh any further could irritate the general public. Yet it did not want to be seen as losing ground or defeated.
The tit-for-tat game between the authorities and Sa’adeh lasted until the May elections. Putting the dispute with the government on hold, Sa’adeh spared no effort to participate, devoting most of his time and resources to the election campaign. He did not run for election himself but his supporters took part in most constituencies. In issuing the Policy Platform for the elections, Sa’adeh chose to widen the usual debate on reforms to focus on policy objectives that looked more broadly to issues concerned with independence and state building. He re-affirmed his commitment to Lebanon “as a sphere of safety for the strugglers and battlers”8 but refused to put local issues ahead of Syria’s national concerns. The door on compromise slammed even tighter.